Punjab
& Haryana Must Stop Collection of Citizens’ Biometric Data
Govt
overwhelmed by marketing blitzkrieg of surveillance, biometric, communication
technology companies & international financial institutions
April 16, 2012
Chandigarh- The Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar project is a
project that has no support in law.
The collection of biometrics
under the project to create a National Population Register (NPR) is
illegal. This has been underlined by the report of India’s Parliamentary
Standing on Finance. There are good reasons why countries like the UK,
Australia, Philippines and China have rejected UID/Aadhaar and NPR-like
projects, but these seem to have escaped the attention of the governments of
Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh which are implementing them in pursuance of the MoUs they
have signed with the Unique Identification Authority of India(UIDAI).
These projects are based on the
biometric profiling of citizens which, as the Standing Committee on Finance has
observed, is without any legal mandate. These instead represent a
threat to citizens’ rights and States ’autonomy.
The Central Government appears to
have lost its way and has embarked on projects that show a deep disrespect
for citizens of this country The profiling, and the intrusion of privacy,
that is a central aspect of these projects are, among other things, contrary to
the Supreme Court’s judgment dated July 4, 2011 where it reiterated
that the Right to Privacy is a part of the constitutional Right
to Life. The central government appears to have been in disrespectful disdain
of this judgment too when it launched these projects on the basis of
biometrics which is untested and untried, and which have surveillance,
tracking, profiling, tagging and convergence at its core.
The
5 page MoU was initially signed by Punjab Govt on 15
April, 2010 and later revised on June 23, 2010. Haryana Government
signed a 7
page MoU with UIDAI on June 10, 2010. The 5 page MoU between Union
Territory of Chandigarh and UIDAI was signed on June 10, 2012. The MoUs
are attached.
While signing these MoUs it appears that
the governments did not notice that the collection of biometrics is not only an
assault on the dignity and rights of its citizens, but that it is, in fact,
illegal - a fact that the Standing Committee on Finance has expressly set out
in its report. It may also be noticed that even the Identification of Prisoners
Act, 1920, of colonial vintage, reads: “The object of this bill is to provide
legal authority for taking measurements, finger impressions, footprints and
photographs of persons convicted of, or arrested in connection with, certain
offences.” According to the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, at the
time of the acquittal of the prisoner, his biometric data is required to be
destroyed. The UID/Aadhaar project and the NPR, however, aspire
to store the biometric data forever. There is a DNA Bank
Bill that has been prepared and which when enacted could require
the citizen to give one's DNA to the state. What ambitions does this
reveal?
Parliamentarians, legislative
bodies, jurists, legal academia, former judges, lawyers and groups working on
human rights and civil liberties have underlined that central Initiatives such
as the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) of India, National
Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), National Population Register, Unique
Identification (UID)/Aadhaar project and other related projects under execution
are not governed by any legal framework, parliamentary oversight and do not
conform to the Constitutional Mandate.
The
Standing Committee on Finance found that the UID project
is "riddled with serious lacunae and concern areas". It "has
been conceptualised with no clarity of purpose and leaving many things
to be sorted out during the course of its implementation; and is being
implemented in a directionless way with a lot of confusion". It said that the project cannot be allowed to
proceed without the authority of law. "Crucial matters impinging on
security and confidentiality of
information" demands that a law be enacted before the project can be
allowed to go ahead. The Standing Committee found that the UID project is being
implemented in an "overbearing manner without regard to legalities and
other social consequences". Especially, the Standing Committee adverted to
the "serious security concern" raised by the Ministry of Home Affairs
"over the efficacy of the introducer system, involvement of private
agencies in a large scale in the scheme which may become a threat to national
security ..."; and the National Informatics Centre pointing out "that
the issues relating to privacy and security of UID data could be better handled
by storing in a government data centre".
In a significant assessment of the project, it said:"Even
if the aadhaar number links entitlements to targeted beneficiaries, it may not
ensure that beneficiaries have been correctly identified. Thus, the present
problem of proper identification would persist."
It
found that lessons from experiences in other countries
around projects of a like nature have been ignored, including in the
matter of
costs; complexity; untested, unreliable and unsafe technology;
possibility of
risk to the safety and security of citizens; and the requirement of high
standard security measures which would further escalate costs.
Without a national data protection law issues "like
access and misuse of personal information, surveillance, profiling, linking and
matching of databases and securing confidentiality of information etc." cannot
be handled.
The Ministry of Planning had admitted that there was no
feasibility study "which ought to have been done before approving such an
expensive scheme, has been done involving all aspects of the UID scheme
including cost-benefit analysis, comparative costs of aadhaar number and
various forms of existing identity, financial implications and prevention of
identity theft, for example, using hologram enabled ration card to eliminate
fake and duplicate beneficiaries."
The Standing Committee expressed concern about the
dependency of the project on private vendors, "as a result' the
beneficiaries may be forced to pay over and above the charges to be prescribed
by the UIDAI for availing of benefits and services, which are now available free
of cost."
The Standing Committee found the project to be
"full of uncertainty in technology as the complex scheme is built up on
untested, unreliable technology and several assumptions." Further,
"despite adverse observations by the UIDAI"s Biometrics Standards
Committee on error rates of biometrics, the UIDAI is collecting the biometric
information."
The "concerns and apprehensions" besetting
the Standing Committee, and "particularly considering the contradictions
and ambiguities within the Government on its implementation as well as
implications, the Committee categorically convey their unacceptability of the
National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 in its present form
...The Committee would, thus, urge the Government to reconsider and review the
UID scheme as also the proposals contained in the Bill in all its ramifications
and bring forth a fresh legislation before Parliament."
The Central Government has chosen to ignore this report, and not to address any
of these concerns before proceeding with the project. In January this year,
after raising legitimate concerns about the security implications of the way
the UIDAI was collecting data, the Central Home Minister and the Chairperson of
the UIDAI and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission arrived at an
understanding, and agreed to share the population between them for enrolment!
How could a security risk be treated with such casualness?
The PSC report also reveals that the UIDAI’s activities like signing of MoU
with State Governments is without any legal and constitutional mandate. The
recommendations are relevant for Home Ministry’s NPR for Multipurpose National
Identity Card.
The Parliamentary Committee is
categorical that the Central Govt’s Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM)
constituted for the purpose of collating the two schemes namely, the UID and
National Population Register (NPR), has failed. Together with UID, Central
Government is creating NPR by collecting information on specific
characteristics of all usual residents in the country. The NPR would also have
photographs, 10 finger prints and 2 IRIS prints of all usual residents who are
of age 5 years and above. Yet, the Citizenship Act does not mention
biometrics, nor do the 2003 Rules -- making the collection of biometrics as
part of the NPR exercise illegal.
In a November
2011 interview to the print media, the Director General and Mission
Director of the UIDAI had admitted that fingerprints are likely not to work for
authentication. Despite this, the UIDAI is going ahead with the
exercise. The Parliamentary Report notes the absence of a feasibility
study, no cost-benefit assessment, uncertain and untested technology, an
enrollment process that has national security implications, the lack of data
protection and privacy legislation and the disrespect for Parliament by going
ahead with a project that was pending parliamentary approval.
The Parliamentary Committee
considering the National Identification Authority of India (NIDAI) Bill has
presented its report to the Parliament. The report rejects biometric data based
identification of Indians. The report is a severe indictment of the hasty and
`directionless' project which has been "conceptualised with no clarity of
purpose". The Parliamentary Committee has found the biometric technology
being used by UIDAI and NPR is ‘uncertain' and 'untested'. In short:
•
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by the State Governments with the UIDAI
had no prior consultation with the citizens and was done in the most non-transparent
manner. This must be immediately cancelled.
•
State Govts and other agencies ought to note that UIDAI has been trying to push
for the adoption of the UID through multiple committees of several ministries
and for the re-engineering of current systems to fit the requirements of the
UID.
•
Aadhaar and NPR are based on biometric and retinal profile procured from
people. This is the most repulsive aspect of UID/Aadhaar project. Any biometric
profile directly violates the very dignity and privacy of Indian citizens which
is guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. What is normally used for terrorists
and criminals is now sought to be used against the common citizens of this
country.
It should be noted that the
Parliamentary Committee has taken on board studies done in the UK on the
identity scheme that was begun and later withdrawn in May 2010, where the
problems were identified to include"(a) huge cost involved and possible
cost overruns; (b) too complex; (c)untested, unreliable and unsafe technology;
(d) possibility of risk to the safety and security of citizens; and (e)
requirement of high standard security measures, which would result in
escalating the estimated operational costs."
While there is a studied silence
about UID/Aadhaar and National Population Register (NPR) but the related
project of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) has faced bitter
opposition. Citizen groups demand that States should apply their legal minds
and voice concerns about the both. Besides over a dozen State Governments, left
parties, parties from National Democratic Alliance, even members of United
Progressive Alliance have contended that central projects like NCTC violates
the principle of federalism by its arbitrary and making agencies of States
subservient to it. This leads to unacceptable erosion of autonomy of the States
(including those ruled by regional parties) as envisaged in the
Constitution.
The fact is all freedom loving
Indians are opposed to Central Government’s initiatives of Home Ministry like
NPR, NATGRID, NCTC and RFID due to following reasons:
1. Threat to privacy, civil
liberties, federalism, national security, sovereignty and constitution
2. Without democratic,
parliamentary, legal and constitutional sanction
3. Emergence of a Database,
Surveillance State and Property based Democracy
4. Anti-poor and anti-citizen as it
dismantles Public Distribution System and other existing social service
entitlements
5. Promotes outsourcing of
governance
6. Fraught with dangers of caste and
communal overtones
7. Guided by undemocratic
international financial institutions and defence policies of other nuclear
weapon holding countries
8. Adverse consequences of
participation by foreign companies and biometric technology providers and
collection of biometric details an act violation of human rights that turns
citizens into subjects and treats them worse than prisoners. The personal and
biometric data being outsourced to third parties (including foreign companies)
represents an unacceptable security risk for the people in this country, and
for the nation itself. UIDAI has entered into contracts with companies like
Accenture and Safran Group that are providing similar services to Security
Departments of US, France, China and South Korea. This has dangerous
possibilities.
9. Compromises citizens’ rights of
present and future generations
10. It is a boondoggle, an
unnecessary and wasteful project for citizens as it transfers public money to
private parties
It is clear that UID/Aadhaar, NPR,
NATGRID and NCTC are related because they are a threat to citizens’ rights,
federalism and national sovereignty. In the aftermath of PSC report which has rejected
collection of biometric data and these schemes, the illegality and illegitimacy
of the entire surveillance project has come out in open. There is a compelling
logic for the State Governments to adopt the PSC report discuss it in their
respective State Assemblies, with its citizenry and abandon UID/NPR related
uncalled for central database projects.
Citizens’ opposition to UID and NPR
has a historical context. It is also a historical fact that Mahatma Gandhi was
against identification based on biometric data in his days of struggle in South
Africa in the early part of last century. He had burnt the biometric identity
card. A government which insincerely swears by his name stands exposed because
of launching projects which were opposed by Gandhiji.
For Details: Dr. Usha
Ramanathan, Noted Jurist, New Delhi, Email: urushar@gmail.com
