Sectarian Violence in Karachi: Is Pakistan Closer to the Precipice?
The much-feared observance of Muharram is over in Pakistan without
any earth-shattering incidents of sectarian violence. Yet, the period
did see Muharram-linked violence in various parts of the country, with
as many as 38 Shia deaths, apart from dozens of casualties suffered by
the civilians and security forces alike. Some other planned attacks were
thwarted by law-enforcement agencies, including a major threat to
Karachi with the apprehension of a truck full of explosives. It is
another matter that these incidents of violence, or plans for violent
activities, were not considered as major tragedies, thereby indicating
Pakistani society’s supreme indifference towards and acceptance of
religious belief-related violence. Almost all government offices were
closed for two to three days, markets and schools were shut down, and
countless people were driven by fear to confine themselves to their
homes. Special control and monitoring cells were created by all
provincial police establishments. The Punjab government alone claimed to
have deployed more than 100,000 police personnel to keep the terrorists
at bay. The security deployment in Karachi was no less.
In the post-Muharram period, too, there does not seem to be much
change in sectarian tensions. Targeted killings continue in Karachi:
most can be attributed to the Islamic radicals of Tehriq-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) and most victims were the Barelvi/Shia cadres of
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Elsewhere, the campaign to cow down the
media also continues. A bomb was planted in the car of Hamid Mir, the
head of independent Geo TV, which was luckily spotted by his driver; no
harm came to any one. TTP’s spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, claimed
responsibility for the attempt to bomb Mir’s car in a communication to
The Dawn.
What must be noted, however, is that the current wave of violent
attacks and terrorist strikes in Karachi, and elsewhere in Pakistan, is
neither linked to any particular religious festival nor is it the result
of “turf wars” of yore to control areas of influence in the city for
dominating the transport business and smuggling, including that of
narcotics. The violence now is driven by a clear sectarian agenda to
subdue, if not “ethnically cleanse”, the followers of rival, non-Sunni
Islamic sects. TTP’s spokesman in Karachi, Umar Farooq, a former
Jamaat-e-Islami functionary, is already on record as having declared
that “We are a group of Islamic warriors fighting against infidels” and
that “Karachi is our base and we will target anyone our leader
Hakimullah Mehsud tells us to.” The violence in Karachi, it would seem,
has the potential to “Beirutize” that city and totally disrupt normal
functioning.
Karachi, the main port city in Pakistan, is crucial for the country.
Karachi Port and its satellite, Port Qasim, handle practically all
foreign trade to and from the country, including crucial oil imports. If
the city were to be thrown into turmoil, which would cause port
operations to be severely crippled, the Pakistani state would be forced
to its knees. This is more so as the alternative Port Gwadar is still
largely non-functional due to the absence of communication links between
it and the rest of the country, and its hinterland still being a
wilderness. Therefore, if Karachi were to be forced into a prolonged
near shutdown, the Taliban’s opponents in Afghanistan—the United States
and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—would be
adversely affected; as would be the Pakistan Army, against which the
current TTP jihad is being waged. The law and order situation in Karachi
has become grimmer over the past few weeks. According to Farhat
Parveen, Director of Pakistan’s National Organisation of Working
Communities, on an average, 13 people are being killed in Karachi every
day. The proliferation of illegal as well as legal fire arms is a major
source fuelling this burgeoning violence. According to a 2009 survey,
1,80,00,000 pieces of fire arms, ranging from pistols to AK-47s, LMGs
and rocket launchers, were held by private citizens in Pakistan. The
number of such arms in Karachi was nearly 20,00,000. Since such arms are
freely available on the black market, even if the government tries to
de-weaponize the country, and particularly Karachi, the city would be
re-weaponized within six months.
Many political leaders from the MQM and the Awami National Party
(ANP) openly advocate Karachi’s law and order responsibility being
handed over to the Army as it is beyond the capabilities of local
law-enforcement agencies. This is buttressed by a statement made in
court by the Police Chief of Sindh that while Rangers could only arrest
people and hand them over to the Police for prosecution, the Police
force itself had many personnel of dubious political patronage who felt
powerful enough to disobey orders. It is not difficult to comprehend
that such persons may have easily been subverting efforts to fight
sectarian violence-related crimes. This is in addition to the fact that
the Police force in the city is grossly under strength, as only 8,000
policemen are available for normal policing duties in police stations at
any given time, the rest being deployed on other errands. The traders
in the city are stated to be arming themselves as neither the security
agencies nor the protection money being paid by them is buying them
security, and they have been proving to be easy game for the
extortionists. It has been assessed that in the current wave of violence
in Karachi the losses suffered by traders is around Rs 20 billion and
that by the industrialists at around Rs 45 billion.
It is true that the Pakistan government and the Army would not easily
let the situation in Karachi go totally out of hand and can be expected
to do the utmost to salvage the situation—Zardari and Kayani are
reported to have already met on November 23 in Islamabad, ostensibly
with the situation in the city as the main point of their parleys.
However, any effort to shore up the security situation in Karachi by
bringing additional Army units into the city would serve the operational
interests of the TTP as it would ease pressure against them in FATA and
other areas, and indefinitely delay any planned operation in North
Waziristan. Given its traditional mind-set and India fixation, the
Pakistan Army is unlikely to pull back troops from the east and,
therefore, any planned additional deployment in Karachi would have to
come from elsewhere in the country, something that the TTP could be
hoping for.
Dealing with this clear and present danger to the Pakistani state
requires unity of purpose and synergy between various components of the
Pakistani apparatus. However, this synergy is largely missing and, as a
result, the Pakistani state is responding to the growing Taliban threat
in Karachi in a knee-jerk manner. The public sniping between the
Judiciary and the Army has only intensified over the past couple of
weeks with both sides using their surrogates to strike at the other.
Even after their open spat through media statements late last month—with
Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary emphasizing the Judiciary’s
constitutional predominance over all other institutions, including the
Army, and General Kayani warning all and sundry, including the
judiciary, that assuming the due role of other institutions would set
“us back”—the looming confrontation between the Judiciary and the Army
has not receded. According to Najam Sethi, the Army is behind the
periodical salvos that Malik Riaz (the person alleged to be an
accomplice of Dr Arsalan Iftikhar, the son of the Chief justice of
Pakistan, in some shady real estate and financial deals) fires against
the Chief Justice. It is interesting to note that on November 15,
General Kayani’s statement was once again commented upon by the full
bench of the Supreme Court, which had ostensibly been called to discuss
the rising backlog of cases. The Bench instead asserted that the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction also allowed it to check any unlawful,
unauthorised, or malafide act or exercise of the authorities. Sections
of the legal community have also joined in on the issue with the
District Bar Association of Rawalpindi hurling (on November 16) strongly
worded, even intemperate, statements against the Army by calling for
the recovery of looted money from all, including Army officers. The Bar
Association has also accused Kayani of favouring his brother in various
defence deals and other military matters, and trying to intimidate the
Judiciary through his public statements.
The Army’s top-brass, which was stated to have been greatly annoyed
with judicial assertiveness over cases involving past acts of omission
and commission by Army Generals, and such other direct assaults on the
Army’s sacrosanct and privileged actions—such as General Kayani’s tenure
extension —being challenged in a court of law. There is now a strong
undercurrent of open disquiet among the Army’s top-brass over the latest
attacks from the Judiciary and the lawyers, and this is reflected in
the incident of Col. (Retd.) Inam-ur Raheem being roughed up by unknown
assailants in Rawalpindi on November 15 just a couple of hundred of
metres from the GHQ. Col. Raheem is the petitioner who has challenged
Kayani’s extension in the Islamabad High Court. The Police has shown
little interest in pursuing this case.
All these developments bode ill for Pakistan. If the TTP and its
radical allies are waging a relentless war to convert Pakistan into a
true Islamic state and a powerful bastion of Deobandi/Wahabi Islam, then
their interest in seriously disrupting life in Karachi and thereby
trying to dominate the city has a lot of merit. However, their success
could deliver a crippling blow to the Pakistani establishment and could
also usher in the emergence of diverse pockets of local dominance in
Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, and even Sindh.
